In 1805-1882, Egypt embarked on one of the earliest state industrialization programs. Using a new data source, the Egyptian nineteenth-century population censuses, I examine the impact of the program on the long-standing inter-religious human capital differentials, which were in favor of Christians. I find that there were inter-religious differentials in reaping the benefits (or losses) of industrialization. The first state industrialization wave was "de-skilling" among Muslims but "up-skilling" among Christians, while the second wave was "up-skilling" for both groups. I interpret the results within Katz and Margo (2013) framework of technical change.
Introduction

Look at this battalion… There are there Arabs and Copts, Mussulmans and Christians, that march in the same rank. I assure you that not one of them troubles himself about his comrade's religion. Equality between them is complete.
Ismail, Khedive of Egypt (1863 -1879 (in Gabriel Charmes 1883, p. 161) Does industrialization act as a "melting-pot," reducing human capital differentials between ethnoreligious groups? Or do some groups benefit more than others from industrialization, hence, altering the long standing distribution of human capital among groups? This is a particularly important concern in ethno-religiously diverse societies, where conflicts over the distribution of the benefits (or losses) from industrialization among groups may impede the "nation-building" process. In fact, political science and sociology scholars, such as Joseph Rothschild (1981) , Anthony Smith (1981) , Ronald Rogowski (1985) , and Walker Connor (1994) , emphasize the importance of industrialization's redistribution to explain the persistence of ethno-religious conflicts in industrialized economies. Their explanation up ends the classic thesis whereby industrialization's widespread benefits allowed scholars to ignore the challenges imposed by ethno-religious diversity.
1 A more recent literature, including Edward Miguel (2004) , Saumitra Jha (2013) , and Rikhil R. Bhavnani and Jha (2013) , examines how state policies and trade affect the provision of public goods, ethno-religious conflicts, and mass-mobilization. However, relatively little is known on whether, and how, industrialization alters inter-group human capital inequality. This evaluation is necessary if we are to understand which "nation-building" industrialization programs succeed or fail, and the consequent evolution of inter-group relations in various parts of the world.
This article attempts to evaluate the impact of nineteenth-century Egypt's state industrialization program on the human capital of its two major religious groups (Muslims and Christians). Native nonMuslims in Egypt traditionally had higher human capital than the Muslim majority. Indeed Muslims were underrepresented among medium-and high-skilled workers, especially in urban Egypt (Figure 1 ).
Specific organizations, guilds and elementary religious schools (kuttabs), preserved these differentials for centuries by constraining access to skills (artisanship, literacy, and numeracy). Muhammad Ali Pasha, the autonomous Ottoman viceroy of Egypt, and his successors, led an ambitious state industrialization program that occurred in two waves in 1816-1848 (mostly, textiles) and 1848-1868 (mostly, transportation) . Historians, such as Abdulrahman Al-Raf'i (1982 [1930 [1932 ), Jacques Tagher (1998 Tagher ( [1951 ), and Afaf Lutfi Al-Sayyid Marsot (1984) , portray the program as the cornerstone of Egypt's inter-religious integration and "nation-building," that fostered two nationalist uprisings in 1881 and 1919. In the latter, Muslims and Christians revolted together against the British Occupation under the remarkable slogan, "Long lives the crescent with the cross!" For these scholars although the program did not produce economic development, it triggered a social transformation. 2 For example, in 1848, state firms employed eight percent of the adult active male urban population and in 1868 three percent, forming the nucleus of the Egyptian working class that played a crucial role in the 1919 revolution. However, we cannot take this view at face value. Did the program in fact act as a "nationbuilding" device, reducing human capital differentials between Muslims and Christians? In an economy with low-, medium-, and high-skilled labor, where Christians have greater shares of medium-and highskilled labor, industrialization might well shift the relative demand for, or supply of, each labor type and thus inter-religious human capital differentials. On the one hand, Claudia Goldin and Lawrence F. Katz (1998) , Jeremy Atack, Fred Bateman, and Robert A. Margo (2004) , and Katz and Margo (2013) demonstrated in the U.S. context that industrialization, a technical transition from the artisanal shop to the factory, may induce demand shifts. These shifts may benefit one religious group more than another because initially, at least, Christians were over represented among medium-and high-skilled urban 2 The average annual growth rate of real GDP per capita in Egypt stood at 0.4 percent in 1820-1870, in contrast to 1.1 percent in the U.S. and Western Europe, or to 0.7 percent in the non-industrialized Lebanon, over the same period (Pamuk 2006) . 3 Workers in state transportation enterprises, the largest employer in the country by 1900 (Toledano 1998, p. 261) , established the first labor union and initiated the first strikes in Egyptian labor history (Beinin and Lockman 1987, pp. 57-82). workers. On the other hand, one could argue following Ann Bartel (1989 and , John Bishop (1994) , Sandra E. Black and Lisa M. Lynch (1996) Marsot (1984) , Pascale Ghazaleh (1999) and Roger Owen (2002) . Equally important to Egyptian history are the extent and evolution of the human capital of non-Muslims, a phenomenon that Jacques Tagher (1998 Tagher ( [1951 ), Charles Issawi (1981) and Youssef Courbage and Philippe Fargues (1997) documented.
To do so however required collecting data on religion, human capital, and the potential exposure to industrialization. In fact, a revisionist historian, Khaled Fahmy (2009, p. 126) Despite the relative richness of the data, they impose certain limitations on estimating the impact of state industrialization. In particular the censuses have no measure of income so we must focus on social status. The social status index (SSI) classifies each occupation into low-, medium-, and high-skilled ranges, following the HISCLASS measure that was constructed by Marco H. D. van Leeuwen and Ineke Maas (2005) . I analyze the distribution of SSI scores in an ordered logit regression with district fixed effects. To simplify the interpretation of the non-linear results, I report the results for a specific profile: an Egyptian, free, non-black, and non-migrant male of average age (averaging out the district fixed effects).
Perhaps a more challenging limitation is the potential endogeneity of industrialization. Indeed, I
observe the actual employment of individuals in state firms rather than their potential exposure to state industrialization. I exploit the within-district cross-sectional variation between workers in state firms and in the traditional sector in the 1848 and 1868 samples, which were collected at the end of each industrialization wave. Hence, I am not able to disentangle the causal effect of state industrialization, because workers in state firms could be different in their pre-industrialization characteristics from those in the traditional sector, even after controlling for observed characteristics. For this reason, I interpret the findings using a conceptual framework based on Katz and Margo (2013) (henceforth, KM), which extends Goldin and Katz (1998) and Atack, Bateman, and Margo (2004) . The framework explains the differential effect of technical change (state industrialization) on the skill distribution for Muslims and Christians via two mechanisms: (a) shifts in the relative demands for low-, medium-, and high-skilled labor, whereby state firms recruit workers with skills that were acquired in the traditional sector, without altering the relative skill supplies, and (b) on-the-job training, whereby state firms recruit unskilled workers and train them up to fill in jobs, hence shifting the relative skill supplies.
I find that in 1848 state firms had relatively fewer medium-skilled Muslim and Christian workers than the traditional sector, with a stronger effect on the latter in urban Egypt. For Muslims the effect was compounded by a drop in the probability of being a high-skilled worker, resulting in a "de-skilling" effect on Muslims. For Christians, the dearth of medium skill jobs in state firms was offset by a rise in the probability of being a high-skilled worker, perhaps to fill in the administrative jobs in state firms, resulting in an "up-skilling" effect on Christians. In contrast, state industrialization in 1868 (equally) decreased the probability of being a low-skilled worker among both Muslims and Christians, resulting in an "up-skilling" effect on both groups. But while the "up-skilling" of Muslims was via an increase in the probability of being a medium-skilled worker and the probability of being a high-skilled worker, the "upskilling" of Christians was solely via an increase in the probability of being a high-skilled worker, which was greater than the increase among Muslims.
I provide suggestive evidence on whether the findings are driven by skill demand or supply shifts via decomposing the effect of state industrialization into two components. First, there are SSI differences between workers in old occupations in state firms and in the traditional sector. These are occupations that existed in both sectors and so state firms presumably recruited workers into these jobs with skills that had already been acquired in the traditional sector, suggesting that the observed SSI differences may be attributed to demand shifts. Second, there are SSI differences between workers in new versus old occupations within state firms. New occupations, such as machine operatives, railways drivers, ticket conductors, telegraphers, and printing workers, were created by state firms, and presumably required providing on-the-job training, suggesting that the observed SSI differences may be attributed to supply shifts. I find that the findings in both 1848 and 1868 hold among workers in old occupations, suggesting that demand shifts account for the findings. However, on-the-job training in 1848 seems to have driven Muslim and Christian workers into low-skilled occupations (machine operatives), and in fact accounts for 
Egypt's Labor Markets
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Egyptian labor market was organized through the guild system (ta'ifa) that encompassed most urban workers (Baer 1964, pp. 16-48) . Apprenticeship, the sole route for accession to artisanship, and the jedik, a required fee to practice a craft in a workshop, both made guild membership constrained (Baer 1964, pp. 49-76, 107; André Raymond 1973, pp. 544-51) .
Christians were over-represented in specific artisanal occupations (weavers, spinners, carpenters, jewelers, tailors) and white-collar occupations (scribes, bookkeepers, tax collectors) (Raymond 1973, pp. 456-59) , and they imposed significant barriers to entry into these occupations.
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The alternative route for acquiring (white-collar) skills, besides apprenticeship, was education.
Schools, however, were traditionally segregated by religion, as elementary religious schools (kuttabs)
were the sole providers of education around 1800 (James Heyworth-Dunne 1938, pp. 2-7, 84-92) .
Historical evidence suggests that non-Muslim kuttabs were more inclined towards "useful knowledge" -Gritli 1952, pp. 51-65; Moustafa Fahmy 1954, pp. 21-54) . 70 percent of these firms were in the two major cities, Cairo and Alexandria. With median employment of 163 workers, state firms were larger than traditional artisanal shops. They also employed machines that were a crude imitation of Europe's technology. A few factories used steam power to operate the machines, but the vast majority resorted to animal power.
To fund his ambitious projects, Ali monopolized internal and external trade, and centralized the tax system (Owen 2002, pp. 65-66) . Nonetheless, by 1868, 67 percent of his factories had closed down, and employment in the surviving ones in Cairo and Alexandria was 25% of its peak. Traditional accounts of the failure of state owned firms focus on the 1838 Anglo-Turkish commercial convention which abolished monopolies and reduced tariffs in the Ottoman Empire, and the 1841 London treaty which limited the size of the Egyptian army, the raison d'être of the factories (Owen 2002, pp. 75-76) . Owen, however, suggests that there were structural causes for the failure such as a decline in Ali's authority after 1837, unqualified personnel, and the fuel and power problems. Perhaps most importantly, the fact that industrialization was undertaken by the state rather than by local entrepreneurs implies that the transition was not profitable enough to incentivize the private sector to industrialize. This might also be because
Egypt lacked the human capital that allowed entrepreneurs and the general labor force in Western Europe and the U.S. to adopt new production technologies (Owen 2002, p. 72 ).
Ali's successors focused on transportation in the second wave of industrialization after 1848.
Railways, telegraph, steam navigation, and tramways employed 58 percent of the workers in state firms in 1868 (Al-Hitta 1967, pp. 215-91) . The share of military industries remained stable at 22 percent; textiles'
share fell sharply to 3 percent, while other industries, such as printing, tannery, and coin making, accounted for 17 percent. Cairo and Alexandria housed 86 percent of the projects. The technology used in these projects was presumably more capital-intensive than it had been in the first wave. Both internal and external debts were used to fund the second wave, and the increased debt (especially for the Suez Canal)
led to the British Occupation in 1882. Many of the transportation enterprises, however, survived until today.
Conceptual Framework Industrialization and the Relative Demand for Skills
I employ the KM framework in order to understand the effect of industrialization on the Christian-Muslim human capital gap. Muslim workers fall into three categories: high-skilled (denoted by
, and unskilled (L M ), the same for Christians. Both groups supply each type of labor inelastically and Christians are the minority. Labor markets are competitive, but access to artisanship, literacy, and numeracy is not. Guilds and religious schools (kuttabs), which provided access to these skills, resorted to non-competitive admission policies that were more favorable to Christians leading to their over-representation among artisans and white-collar workers:
Where is the percentage of workers who are Christian; ̅ captures the over-representation of
Christians among artisans and ̅ ℎ captures the over-representation of Christians among white-collar workers. These assumptions imply that:
Industrialization involves workers moving from artisanal shops (T) to factories (F). Each of the two production technologies has three tasks: (1) artisans and raw capital ( ) are combined to produce operating capital ( ) via a Leontief technology, (2) unskilled workers and operating capital are combined to produce the final output via a Cobb-Douglas technology, and (3) non-production administrative services are produced using white-collar workers in proportion to the amount of unskilled labor used in the second task:
Labor and output markets are competitive. Firms choose H, S, L, and given factor prices ( , , ℎ , and ) to minimize costs. As Atack, Bateman, and Margo (2004) demonstrate, the optimal ratio of unskilled labor to operating capital in the second task is a function (Φ) of the final output and the ratio of the rental price of operating capital ( ) to the unskilled wage:
Define the optimal shares of unskilled workers, artisans, and white-collar workers (relative to the total labor force) as lower-case , , and ℎ respectively. It follows that:
I make one (slight) modification to the KM framework. While I follow KM in arguing that state projects and artisanal shops have different (ratio of artisans to raw capital in the first task), Φ (ratio of unskilled workers to operating capital in the second task), and (ratio of white-collar workers to unskilled workers in the third task), I allow these differences to vary by industry: textiles (X) and transportation (P).
First, textiles factories perhaps had lower than artisanal textiles shops. Relatively few artisans (blacksmiths; tinsmiths) were required in factories because of the economies of scale in installing and maintaining machines, unlike artisanal shops where spinners and weavers maintained their own tools (KM, p.11). However, state transportation enterprises perhaps had higher than the traditional transportation industry. More artisans (blacksmiths; mechanics) were required in state enterprises to install and maintain railways, steamships, telegraph, and tramways, unlike traditional transportation where few artisans (blacksmiths, carpenters) were needed to build animal-driven vehicles and boats.
Second, because of mechanization and division of labor, state textiles manufactories had higher Φ than artisanal shops. Factories required a lot of unskilled machine operatives in production, unlike textiles shops that used very little unskilled labor. By contrast, because of the (medium) skill requirements of most of its operations (railways and tramways driving, ticket conducting, telegraph operations, steam navigation), state transportation enterprises required little unskilled labor, unlike traditional transportation that required a lot of unskilled animal drivers and boatmen. 8 8 Strictly speaking, the model assumes that no artisans or white-collar workers are used in production (the second task), which contradicts the nature of production in state transportation enterprises that used medium-skilled workers (railways and tramways drivers, ticket conductors, telegraphers) in the production phase. I chose to keep the framework simple since it only serves as a conceptual framework to interpret the results. Also, one may assume that Finally, because of their large size, both textiles and transportation enterprises had presumably higher than the traditional industries. Many white-collar workers were required to handle the accounting, bookkeeping, and other administrative (non-production) operations in state firms.
The aforementioned differences within industry j (= ) between technologies i (= )
can be summarized as follows: (1) < , Φ > Φ , and > ; and (2) > , Since labor markets are competitive, recruitment in state manufactories is "religion-neutral."
Hence, one could derive the effects of industrialization on the shares of unskilled workers, artisans, and white-collar workers among Muslims and Christians, relative to the group size:
Proposition 2: The effects on Christians of changes in demand for medium and high skilled workers are stronger than for Muslims.
Industrialization and the Relative Supplies of Skills
The above analysis examined the impact of state industrialization on the Christian-Muslim human capital gap via affecting the relative demands for the three types of labor. However, the relative supplies of labor may also shift with industrialization. For example, on-the-job training in state projects may increase the relative supplies of artisans and/or white-collar workers. On-the-job training could be religion-neutral or religion-biased. In the first case, it would induce an outward shift in the relative supply of artisans and/or white-collar workers, holding ̅ and ̅ ℎ constant, while, in the second case, it would affect ̅ and/or ̅ ℎ , holding the relative labor supplies constant.
the medium-skilled workers in state transportation enterprises were mainly employed in the first task, i.e. in installing and maintaining railways, steamships, tramways, and telegraph.
Data
Examining the impact of state industrialization on the inter-religious human capital differentials requires gathering individual-level data on religion, human capital, and exposure to industrialization. I digitized two nationally representative samples (about 80,000 records each) of the 1848 and 1868
Egyptian censuses from the original manuscripts, and I constructed an oversample of non-Muslims in non-primary (see online appendix B for details). I then collapse the scores into three ranges that correspond to low-, medium-, and high-skilled workers.
I control for a number of individual characteristics that are plausibly exogenous in the empirical analysis. These are: (1) age, which is reported in full years, (2) legal status, which has three categories:
free, slave, and emancipated slave. I measure this variable using a "slave" dummy variable that takes the value of one if an individual is a slave or an emancipated slave, (3) nationality, which has two categories: under government's control (Egyptians, who include Nubians, Sudanese, and Abyssinians) and outside government's control (foreigners who could be Ottomans, such as Turks, North Africans, Ottoman Greeks, and Levantines or non-Ottomans, such as Moroccans, Europeans, Americans, and Asians), (4) ethnicity such as Nubian, Abyssinian, Sudanese, Turkish, Levantine, Ottoman Greek, and Armenian. I measure this variable using a "black" dummy variable that takes the value of one if an individual is Abyssinian, Sudanese, or Nubian, and (5) migration, which is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if an individual's province of birth is different from province of residence. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics. The sample size varies from one variable to another to show the degree of missing values for each variable. Around 3 percent of urban Egyptians were "without occupation," 3 percent were out of labor force (students and retired), and 8 percent had missing occupations in 1848 (the values for 1868 were 5, 3 and 12 percent respectively). In the countryside, the percentages of unemployed and out of labor force are negligible but the percentage missing is particularly high at 27 percent in 1848 (31 percent in 1868), perhaps because they were presumed to be farmers.
About 40-45 percent of the labor force in urban Egypt was low-skilled, 41-42 percent was medium-skilled, and 15-17 percent was high-skilled. The percentage of medium-skilled workers is high in rural Egypt, since this category includes farmers. The religious composition is quite stable across the two years and across urban and rural provinces, with Muslims constituting the vast majority (about 90 percent),
followed by Christians (6-7 percent), and Jews (1 percent), but the latter are mainly urban. 10 The average age in Cairo and Alexandria is about 37 years, and is slightly higher in the countryside. 
Empirical Analysis Empirical Strategy and Results
To study the impact of Egypt's state industrialization, a natural starting point is to compare the skill distribution of each religious group across state firms and the traditional sector (which includes everyone else outside state firms). Table 2 shows this comparison. Among Christians in state firms in 1848, there are relatively equal low-skilled workers, fewer medium-skilled workers, and more highskilled workers, than in the traditional sector. The same comparison holds in 1868 except that there are relatively fewer low-skilled Christians in state firms than in the traditional sector. By contrast, among
Muslims in state firms in 1848, there are relatively more low-skilled workers and fewer medium-and high-skilled workers, than in the traditional sector. In 1868, the comparison is reversed with relatively fewer low-and medium-skilled workers and more high-skilled workers than in the traditional sector.
This preliminary evidence suggests that the effect of state industrialization varied by religious group and industrialization wave. Christians in state firms seem to have experienced an "up-skilling" effect in both waves, while Muslims were "de-skilled" in the first wave but "up-skilled" in the second. Unfortunately I do not observe the potential exposure to state industrialization, but rather the actual exposure: is defined as a dummy variable for being employed in a state firm, with the counterfactual being all workers (within a district) outside state firms, which I call the "traditional sector."
Because workers in state firms may have had different pre-industrialization characteristics from those in the traditional sector, even after controlling for observable characteristics, the results should therefore be interpreted as correlations. Moreover, instead of wages I have three socio-economic categories:
11 The incidental parameters problem, which arises when including fixed effects in a non-linear model such as the ordered logit, is not a concern here, because the number of individuals in the sample (17,944 in 1848 and 18,318 in 1868) is quite large relative to the number of districts of residence (97 in 1848 and 48 in 1868). = < * < +1 ; = 1,2,3
Assuming that are standard logistically distributed, I estimate the conditional probability that the SSI equals each of its categories (m = 1, 2, 3) using an ordered logit specification:
(1) ( = | )
The ordered logit model is difficult to interpret. Indeed the marginal effect (henceforth, ME) of state industrialization on the predicted relative probability of an individual in a state owned enterprise of having a specific SSI value depends on the value of the SSI and all the regressors. To simplify the interpretation, I compute the MEs of state industrialization for a specific profile: Egyptian, free, non-black, and non-migrant adult active male of average age (averaging out the district fixed effects). One should keep in mind that the MEs must sum up to zero across the three SSI categories. In all the regressions standard errors are clustered at the urban quarter/village-level. The core results of the paper are shown in Table 3 . Panel (A) shows the ME of being employed in a state firm on the probability that the SSI equals each of its three categories for 
The results are shown in Table 3 in 1848 (and 1868) at the low-and high-skill levels are driven by the state industrialization of both textiles (and transportation) and other industries.
But, the MEs of state industrialization of textiles and transportation at the medium-skill level are both statistically insignificant.
The results for Cairo and Alexandria are qualitatively similar except among Christians in 1848:
As for the full sample in panel (A) of Table 3 , Christians in state firms in Cairo and Alexandria are differentially less likely than Muslims to be medium-skilled but the difference now is statistically significant. Also, the ME of state industrialization of textiles among Christians in Cairo and Alexandria is negative and statistically significant at the medium-skill level.
Interpretation of the Results
The findings are generally consistent with the conceptual framework. As expected, the state's push into textiles in 1848, decreased the share of medium-skilled workers among both Muslims and Christians, with a stronger effect on the latter in Cairo and Alexandria (but not in the full sample), generating a "hollowing-out" of occupations or "job polarization" effect. This negative effect came about because Muslims had a particularly relatively low share of high-skilled workers, resulting in a net "deskilling" effect: an increase in the share of low-skilled workers. For Christians, however, the negative effect on the share of medium-skilled workers was offset by greater increase in the share of high-skilled workers, resulting in a net "up-skilling" effect, a decrease in the share of low-skilled workers.
Also, as the model predicts, state's later push into transportation required relatively few lowskilled workers among both Muslims and Christians, generating an "up-skilling" effect on both groups.
However, there are inter-religious differentials in the "up-skilling:" The share of medium-skilled workers rose among Muslims but fell among Christians (for the latter, the effect is statistically significant overall, but insignificant in transportation). Further, industrialization increased the share of high-skilled workers among both Muslims and Christians, and, as the model predicts, the effect was stronger among Christians given their initial literacy and numeracy advantage.
However, there are two findings that deviate from the model's predictions: First, while model implies that industrialization of textiles in 1848 should have increased the share of high-skilled workers among both Muslims and Christians I find a negative effect on Muslims. Second, although the model implies that industrialization of transportation in 1868 should have raised the share of medium-skilled workers more for Christians than Muslims, I find a significantly greater effect among Muslims.
In both cases the coarse skill grid I use is likely to blame. Table 5 shows the detailed occupational distribution in textiles and transportation in both the traditional sector and state firms. State textiles firms in 1848 increased the relative demand for only a sub-class of high-skilled workers: scribes and bookkeepers, where Christians were over-represented in the traditional sector (58 percent), but they decreased the relative demand for textiles merchants, who were all Muslims. In 1868, state transportation firms increased the relative demand for a sub-class of medium-skilled workers: low-ranked administrative personnel, where Muslims were over-represented in the traditional sector (94 percent), but decreased the relative demand for carpenters, where Christians were over-represented (14 percent). 12 The alternative explanation would be that the recruitment policies of state firms were biased, compared to the traditional sector, thus contradicting the competitive labor markets assumption of the model. In particular, state projects resorted in 1848, but not in 1868, to coercive recruitment of workers (Owen 2002, p. 76; Marsot 1984, pp. 181-5; Ghazaleh 1999, p. 122; Sami 1928, Vol. 2, p. 374) . This might have forcibly overdrafted Muslims into low-skilled occupations away from medium-and high-skilled occupations (differential forced de-skilling).
Did State Industrialization Shift the Relative Supplies of Skills?
So far, I have argued that the findings are driven by shifts in the relative demands for low-, medium-, and high-skilled workers, without altering the relative supplies of skills. There is at least suggestive evidence that there was a supply side response via on-the-job training in state firms. In order to explore this possibility, I separate workers in state firms into two categories: (i) workers in old occupations, which existed in both state firms and the traditional sector (comprising 73 percent and 66 percent of workers in state firms in 1848 and 1868 respectively), and (ii) workers in new occupations, which existed in state firms only. 13 The rationale is that workers in old occupations were likely hired already trained into state firms, and hence differences in average SSI between them and workers in the traditional sector could be attributed to shifts in the relative demands for skills via technological differences between the traditional sector and state firms. On the other hand, workers needed in new occupations had to be trained by the firms, and so differences in average SSI between them and workers in old occupations within state firms could be attributed to shifts in the relative supplies of skills via onthe-job training. Indeed, within state firms, workers in new occupations are (slightly) younger than those in old occupations, suggesting that they might have been recruited before acquiring any skills in the traditional sector. 14 This is only an approximation, however, because skills needed for old occupations in state projects may have been acquired via on-the-job training, and the sample size of Christians in new occupations is small in both 1848 and 1868. Thus, the evidence presented below is only suggestive.
I extend the ordered logit regression to include , a dummy variable that takes the value of one if an individual works in a new occupation in state firms. By construction, is equal to zero for all workers in the traditional sector and workers in old occupations in state firms:
The results of this exercise are shown in Table 6 . The ME in old occupations compares workers in old occupations in state firms to workers in the traditional sector, while the additional ME in new occupations compares workers in new and old occupations within state firms. Overall, the results of Table   3 for both 1848 and 1868 hold if we compare workers in old occupations in state firms to workers in the traditional sector, suggesting that demand shifts may account for the effects of state industrialization.
However, it appears that on-the-job training in state firms caused a supply response among both Muslims 
Conclusion
State industrialization was widely adopted in various parts of the world in both the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries. Using samples that I digitized from the 1848 and 1868 Egyptian census manuscripts, I examined employment in Egyptian state owned enterprises that were set up as part of two industrialization programs. I find that the state industrialization of textiles in 1848 had "hollowed-out" occupations, with relatively smaller shares of medium-skilled workers among both Muslims and Christians, with a stronger effect on Christians (in urban Egypt). For Muslims the decrease in the share of artisans was accompanied by a relatively low share of high-skilled workers leading to a large "de-skilling" effect. For Christians the relatively low share of mediums skilled workers was offset by a larger share of high-skilled workers, leading to an "up-skilling" effect. In contrast, I find that the state industrialization of transportation in 1868 was "up-skilling" for both Muslims and Christians. But while the "up-skilling" of Muslims was through an increase in the share of medium-skilled workers and the share of high-skilled workers, the "up-skilling" of Christians was only through an increase in the share of high-skilled workers.
These findings contribute to our understanding of technical change and the relative demand for skills in the nineteenth century. Egypt's state industrialization of textiles was "de-skilling" (for the Muslim majority) in ways that are similar to the findings of Goldin and Sokoloff (1982) and Atack, Bateman, and Margo (2004) for the U.S. Perhaps more importantly is the finding of a "hollowing-out" effect, or that the "de-skilling" mostly hit the medium-skilled artisans but that the relative demand for white-collar workers may have actually increased in order to handle the administrative services that are essential under the factory system. This is similar to what KM recently noted as a revision to our The evidence allows us two additional findings. First the "de-skilling" or "up-skilling" effects varied systematically by group consistent with the existence of large initial inter-group differences in skills.
Second, the "de-skilling" or "up-skilling" effects varied by industry because of the different skill requirements of the industrialization of textiles and transportation relative to the traditional textiles and transportation industries.
The findings perhaps put the Egyptian state industrialization programs in sharp contrast to the twentieth century socialist programs, which explicitly aimed at reducing inequality, and brings them closer to other programs in "late-industrializing" countries in the nineteenth century (for example, Russia and Japan) that were more motivated by military expansion and maximizing tax revenues. Whether these programs, which were, unlike the Egyptian program, economically successful, actually increased or decreased inter-group (or overall) inequality is, to the best of my knowledge, an area for further research.
What is interesting in Egypt, however, is that convergence in socioeconomic outcomes between religious groups in Egypt had to await the second major Egyptian state-led modernization program under Nasser . It is the emphasis on providing access to public secular education to the masses in 1953-6 that made the program relatively more successful than its nineteenth-century precedent in improving the lot of Muslims and reducing their human capital gap vis-à-vis non-Muslims (Saleh 2013b The reported MEs are estimated from a single ordered logit regression (equation 1), where standard errors are clustered at the urban quarter/village-level. The ME is the difference in the predicted probability that the SSI equals one of its three values, between workers in state projects and in the traditional sector for an Egyptian, free, nonblack, and non-migrant adult male of average age, averaging out the district fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses and are calculated (in columns 1, 2, 4, and 5) by the Delta method using the "margins" command in STATA. Standard errors of differences in MEs (columns 3, 6, 7, 8, and 9) are calculated by applying the "lincom" command to the "margins" results in STATA. The reported MEs are estimated from a single ordered logit regression (equation 2), where standard errors are clustered at the urban quarter/village-level. The ME is the difference in the predicted probability that the SSI equals one of its three values, between workers in state projects (textiles versus all other sectors) and in the traditional sector (textiles versus all other sectors, whether targeted by state industrialization or not) for an Egyptian, free, nonblack, and non-migrant adult male of average age, averaging out the district fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses and are calculated (1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, and 11) by the Delta method using the "margins" command in STATA. Standard errors of differences in MEs (columns 3, 6, 9, and 12) are calculated by applying the "lincom" command to the "margins" results in STATA. The reported MEs are estimated from a single ordered logit regression (equation 3), where standard errors are clustered at the urban quarter/village-level. The ME in old occupations is the difference in the predicted probability that the SSI equals one of its three values, between workers in old occupations in state projects and all workers in the traditional sector for an Egyptian, free, non-black, and non-migrant adult male of average age, averaging out the district fixed effects. The additional ME in new occupations is the difference in the predicted probability that the SSI equals one of its three values, between workers in new occupations in state projects and workers in old occupations in state projects for an Egyptian, free, non-black, and non-migrant adult male of average age, averaging out the district fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses and are calculated (in columns 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, and 11) by the Delta method using the "margins" command in STATA. Standard errors of differences in MEs (columns 3, 6, 9, and 12) are calculated by applying the "lincom" command to the "margins" results in STATA.
Figure 1: Occupational Distribution by Religious Group in 1848-1868 Egypt
Sample is restricted to males employed who are at least 15 years old, including those with missing age. Statistics are based on the systematic sample only, and are weighted to account for the different sampling rates across provinces. Farmers are classified as medium-skilled workers. Urban Egypt is defined as Cairo and Alexandria, while rural Egypt includes all other provinces. 
